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Before: MCKEE, Chief Judge, FUENTES and CHAGARES, 
Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  July 11, 2014) 
 
Adele L. Abrams, Esq. [ARGUED] 
Law Office of Adele L. Abrams, P.C. 
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Sara L. Johnson, Esq. [ARGUED] 
U.S. Department of Labor 
1100 Wilson Blvd., 22nd Fl.  
Arlington, VA 22209  
 
Attorney for Respondent-Appellee Secretary of Labor 
 
 
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge:  
 Petitioner Shamokin Filler Company, Inc., operates a 
coal preparation facility in Shamokin, Pennsylvania that has 
been regulated by the Federal Mine Safety and Health 
Administration (“MSHA”) since 1977. After a change in 
ownership in 2009, the new owners challenged MSHA’s 
jurisdiction over the Shamokin facility, contending that the 
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Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”), 
not MSHA, should oversee it.
1
  The Secretary of Labor, along 
with an Administrative Law Judge for the Federal Mine 
Safety and Health Review Commission, and the same 
Commission’s appellate body, all disagreed and concluded 
that because Shamokin was engaged in the “work of 
preparing the coal,” as defined in the Federal Mine Safety and 
Health Act of 1977 (the “Mine Act”), 30 U.S.C. § 802(i), 
MSHA’s assertion of jurisdiction was proper. Shamokin 
petitions for review of the Commission’s final order, arguing 
that its plant does not engage in the “work of preparing the 
coal” because it makes its 100% coal products out of already 
processed coal.  
  
Shamokin’s interpretation of the statute lacks any basis 
in the text of the Mine Act, and we decline to adopt it. 
Shamokin also requests reversal of an evidentiary 
determination excluding evidence of MSHA’s 
non-jurisdiction over other plants. We find this evidentiary 
challenge to be without merit. For the reasons that follow, we 
will deny the petition for review.  
 
 
I.  BACKGROUND
2
 
                                              
1
 Presumably the new owners desired to avoid the more 
stringent requirements imposed by MSHA regulations and the 
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 801 
et seq. As discussed in more detail below, MSHA, rather than 
OSHA, has much stricter oversight requirements including 
regarding respirable coal dust standards.  
2
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 30 
U.S.C. § 816(a). The Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) 
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A. Legal and Administrative Framework 
  
The U.S. Department of Labor oversees, in relevant 
part, two agencies devoted to workplace safety and worker 
health: OSHA and MSHA. OSHA administers the 
Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970 (the “OSH Act”) 
and regulates workplace safety and worker health unless 
Congress has conferred jurisdiction on another agency in an 
industry-specific statute. See 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(1). In this 
case, OSHA and the OSH Act govern Shamokin’s plant 
unless MSHA, administering the Mine Act, governs instead.  
 The difference in jurisdiction results in a difference in 
oversight. MSHA’s regulatory framework is more specific 
and extensive than OSHA’s in regulating safety and health 
hazards associated with the handling of coal, particularly with 
                                                                                                     
final decision and order, entered on October 18, 2012, was 
not directed for review by the Mine Commission and by law 
became a final order of the Mine Commission on November 
26, 2012. We review the Mine Commission’s legal 
conclusions de novo. See Reich v. D.M. Sabia Co., 90 F.3d 
854, 860 (3d Cir. 1996). We review evidentiary rulings for 
abuse of discretion. See Mach Min., LLC v. Sec’y of Labor, 
Mine Safety & Health Admin., 728 F.3d 643, 659 (7th Cir. 
2013); cf. Gunderson v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 601 F.3d 1013, 
1021 (10th Cir. 2010) (reviewing evidentiary decisions of an 
ALJ of the Department of Labor’s Benefits Review Board 
under an abuse of discretion standard); R & B Transp., LLC v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Admin. Review Bd., 618 F.3d 37, 44 (1st 
Cir. 2010) (same as to decisions of an ALJ of the Department 
of Labor’s Administrative Review Board).  
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regard to workers’ exposure to respirable coal dust. Compare 
30 C.F.R. Part 71 with 29 C.F.R. Part 1910, Subpart Z. 
Because of the dangers inherent in mining, Congress also 
gave the Secretary more rigorous enforcement mechanisms 
under the Mine Act than under the OSH Act. For example, 
the Mine Act, unlike the OSH Act, requires two inspections 
per year for surface mines, permits inspections to be 
conducted without a warrant, and in specified circumstances 
authorizes inspectors to issue orders requiring withdrawal of 
miners from the mine. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 813(a), 814(d), 
814(e), 817(a); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 606 (1981); 
RNS Servs., Inc. v. Sec'y of Labor, Mine Safety & Health 
Admin. (MSHA), 115 F.3d 182, 187 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
 In order to determine whether MSHA and the Mine 
Act govern, we must decide whether the facility to be 
regulated is a “coal or other mine, the products of which enter 
commerce, or the operations or products of which affect 
commerce.” 30 U.S.C. § 803; see RNS Servs., Inc., 115 F.3d 
at 183. In relevant part, a “coal or other mine” under the Mine 
Act includes “lands, . . . facilities, equipment, machines, 
tools, or other property, . . . used in, or to be used in, . . . the 
work of preparing coal . . . and includes custom coal 
preparation facilities.” 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(1)-(h)(2). We have 
found this provision to be “so expansively worded as to 
indicate an intention on the part of Congress to authorize the 
Secretary to assert jurisdiction over any lands integral to the 
process of preparing coal for its ultimate consumer.” RNS 
Servs., Inc., 115 F.3d at 186 (emphasis added). The Mine Act 
defines “the work of preparing the coal” as “the breaking, 
crushing, sizing, cleaning, washing, drying, mixing, storing, 
and loading of bituminous coal, lignite, or anthracite, and 
 6 
 
such other work of preparing such coal as is usually done by 
the operator of the coal mine.” 30 U.S.C. § 802(i).  
 
 We employ a “functional analysis” in assessing 
whether MSHA has jurisdiction, under which we give the 
“broadest possible scope to [M]ine Act coverage.” Pa. Elec. 
Co. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n 
(“Penelec”), 969 F.2d 1501, 1503 (3d Cir. 1992) (quotation 
marks omitted). What matters most is how the company uses 
the coal: 
 
Turning to the case law, in [Penelec], we held 
that “the delivery of raw coal to a coal 
processing facility is an activity within the Mine 
Act, but not the delivery of completely 
processed coal to the ultimate consumer.” 969 
F.2d 1501 [at 1504] (citing Stroh v. Director, 
Office of Workers’ Comp. Progs., 810 F.2d 61, 
64 (3d Cir. 1987)). See also Hanna v. Director, 
Office of Workers’ Comp. Progs., 860 F.2d 88, 
92-93 (3d Cir.1988). In Stroh, we found that 
“shovel[ing coal] into [a] truck, and haul[ing] it 
to independently owned coal processing plants” 
was integral to the work of preparing the coal. 
[810 F.2d] at 62. We further noted that the 
loaded coal’s subsequent transportation over 
public roads did not alter its status as an activity 
that is part of the work of preparing the coal. Id. 
at 65. 
 
Penelec applied a functional analysis, wherein 
the propriety of Mine Act jurisdiction is 
determined by the nature of the functions that 
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occur at a site. That analysis has its roots in 
Wisor v. Director, Office of Workers’ Comp. 
Progs., 748 F.2d 176, 178 (3d Cir.1984), was 
applied in Stroh, 810 F.2d at 64, and has been 
adopted by the Fourth Circuit. See United 
Energy Servs., Inc. v. Federal Mine Safety & 
Health Admin., 35 F.3d 971, 975 (4th Cir. 
1994). 
 
RNS Servs. Inc., 115 F.3d at 184.  
 B. Procedural History 
 Between 1977 and 2009, MSHA treated Shamokin’s 
facility, operated by another owner, as a mine and inspected it 
for compliance with the Mine Act. In 2009, Shamokin 
changed ownership. The current owners (children of the 
former owners) wrote to the Secretary of Labor requesting 
that MSHA relinquish jurisdiction over the plant. The 
Secretary refused. Between 2009 and 2011, the Secretary, 
through MSHA, issued a number of citations against 
Shamokin for violations of the Mine Act that MSHA 
inspectors found at Shamokin’s plant. Among the most 
serious of these citations were numerous violations of 
MSHA’s respirable dust standards.  
 
 Shamokin contested the citations in front of an ALJ of 
the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission. 
Shamokin stipulated that it was liable for the violations and 
associated penalties to the extent that MSHA appropriately 
exercised jurisdiction over the plant. However, Shamokin 
objected to MSHA’s jurisdiction, on the grounds that it was 
not operating a “coal or other mine,” but instead was mainly 
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engaged in the manufacture of products made out of coal 
rather than the preparation of anthracite coal. After an ALJ 
found that MSHA had jurisdiction, Shamokin appealed to the 
Mine Commission’s appellate body, which affirmed the ALJ.  
 
 C. Factual Findings of the Mine Commission 
 
 The facts as found by the Mine Commission are 
conclusive as Shamokin mounts no argument to show that 
they are not supported by substantial evidence. See 30 
U.S.C. § 816(a). The ALJ specifically found that, “the Carbon 
Plant is a custom coal preparation facility that stores, sizes, 
dries and loads coal to make it suitable for subsequent 
industrial use.” App. at A25. The ALJ also determined 
Shamokin’s key witness “offered contradictory, inconsistent, 
and suspect testimony.” Id. Specifically, there was “an 
attempt by the owners to obstruct the amount of coal used by 
the Carbon Plant, the percentage of coal versus non-mined 
materials, and the actual nature and extent of its coal versus 
non-coal operations.” Id. The ALJ determined that 
Shamokin’s assertion that it was principally engaged in 
manufacturing coal products, rather than coal processing, was 
belied by the evidence: “over 6,000 tons of [Shamokin’s] 
product, ‘carb-o-cite,’ made of 100% anthracite coal, was 
sold in 2009, as compared to only a few tons of multiple 
products containing no coal or coal mixtures.  . . . This Court 
noted that neither inspector . . . observed any mixing of coal 
with non-coal materials at the plant.” Id. at A26.  The ALJ 
concluded that “[Shamokin] is storing large amounts of coal, 
screening it to remove impurities and ensure size quality, 
drying it, and loading it in bags appropriately sized to be sold 
in the stream of commerce.” Id. at A28. The Mine 
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Commission’s appellate body affirmed the ALJ’s decision as 
supported by “substantial evidence.” Id. at A36. 
 
 D. Conclusions of Law of the Mine Commission 
 
 The ALJ determined that “[t]he fact that [Shamokin] is 
customizing the formulas to meet industry and customer 
specifications only strengthens the Secretary’s position that 
[Shamokin] is operating a custom coal preparation facility 
and should, therefore, continue to be covered under MSHA’s 
jurisdiction.” Id. at A28. The Mine Commission affirmed, 
concluding that that the ALJ “was correct in concluding that 
the Carbon Plant performs the ‘work of preparing the coal,’ 
and thus is a ‘mine’ . . . subject to jurisdiction under the Mine 
Act.” Id. at A38.  
 
 E. Evidentiary Ruling 
 
 The  ALJ granted the Secretary’s motion seeking to 
exclude evidence gathered by a 2004 MSHA fact-finding 
committee that had reviewed operations at seven facilities 
that Shamokin claimed were similar to its carbon plant. The 
ALJ first found that the evidence of MSHA’s oversight over 
other facilities was irrelevant because MSHA jurisdiction 
should be determined on a “case-by-case basis.” Id. at A2. It 
also found that, even if it were relevant, it should be excluded 
because “its probative value [was] . . . substantially 
outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or . . . a waste of time or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence.” Id. (relying on 29 C.F.R. § 2700.63(a), 
which provides, “relevant evidence, including hearsay 
evidence, that is not unduly repetitious or cumulative is 
admissible,” and Federal Rule of Evidence 403). The ALJ 
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reasoned that the balance in this case weighed in favor of 
exclusion given the case-by-case nature of the inquiry over 
whether MSHA jurisdiction is proper; the fact that it would 
be “cumbersome and impractical” to review “whether and 
why MSHA has exercised or should exercise jurisdiction over 
similar ‘bagging facilities’”; and that Shamokin would be not 
be prejudiced given the otherwise wide breadth of the 
evidentiary hearing. App. at A2-3.   
 
 The ALJ revisited the evidentiary determination after 
the hearing itself, adding that there was no appellate case law 
on the question of whether “a comparative facility analysis 
approach” was proper. Id. at A9. Accordingly, the ALJ found 
that the approach Shamokin requested would detract from 
analysis of the particular facility at issue, sending the tribunal 
on a “jurisdictional safari, searching out all similar facilities 
in the country and comparing alike and non-alike activities, 
structures, operations, and products with that of the subject 
Carbon Plant. [] The collateral inquiries would be endless.” 
Id. at A10.  
 
 The Mine Commission’s appellate body affirmed 
under an abuse of discretion standard, adding that 
Administrative Procedure Act § 556(d) imposes an obligation 
on the agency to have a policy to exclude “irrelevant, 
immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence.” Id. at A39 (citing 
5 U.S.C. § 556(d)). The Mine Commission agreed that the 
evidence was not relevant because “[i]t is unlikely that any 
two facilities would be identical and warrant the same 
conclusion on jurisdiction,” and jurisdiction is “governed by 
the statute, rather than by which of two conflicting 
interpretations by the Solicitor is correct.” App. at A39 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Moreover, 
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given that the evidence was of “limited probative value,” its 
introduction would have “unduly delayed the trial”—
Shamokin would have had to present “a significant number of 
additional witnesses” to “demonstrate the similarities between 
those facilities and its Carbon Plant.” Id. at A40. Finally, the 
appellate body noted that MSHA has asserted jurisdiction 
over Shamokin’s plant for decades, and that there has been no 
change in Shamokin’s operations. Id.   
 
II. DISCUSSION 
 
 A. 30 U.S.C. § 802: “work of preparing the coal” 
 
 Under our functional analysis, Shomakin is engaged in 
“the work of preparing the coal.” In RNS, the loading of coal 
for transport to another facility for further processing was 
considered “the work of preparing the coal,” because the 
“storage and loading of the coal is a critical step in the 
processing of minerals extracted from the earth in preparation 
for their receipt by an end-user, and the Mine Act was 
intended to reach all such activities.” 115 F.3d at 185. 
Shamokin does more than the facility in RNS: Shamokin 
admits that it stores, dries, screens, and bags coal. Under RNS, 
it is subject to MSHA jurisdiction.   
 
 Shamokin nonetheless argues that it is not engaged in 
the work of preparing coal under the Mine Act definition 
because it purchases coal that has already been processed. 
Shamokin supports its argument in four ways worth 
addressing: first, through statutory interpretation, second, 
through relying on a definition of “coal preparation” from the 
now defunct U.S. Bureau of Mines, third, by arguing that the 
statute would lack meaningful boundaries without its 
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proposed limitation, and finally, by relying on case law from 
various Courts of Appeals. Each argument will be addressed 
in turn.
  
 
 Shamokin first makes a statutory argument.  It 
contends that the last phrase in § 802(i), “and such other work 
of preparing such coal as is usually done by the operator of 
the coal mine,” modifies the earlier items in the list such that 
only functions that are usually done by the “operator of a coal 
mine” are regulated under the Mine Act. Petitioner’s Br. at 13 
(emphasis added). In turn, only processing of “raw,” “run-of-
mill” or unprepared coal, not the processing of coal that is 
already in “usable or marketable condition,” would usually be 
done by an operator of a coal mine. Id. The Secretary 
responds that the Mine Act contains no such limitation.  
 
 We believe the Secretary is correct.  The words “raw” 
or “unprepared” or “run-of-mill” never appear anywhere in 
the Mine Act definitions, a strong indication that Congress 
never restricted Mine Act coverage to those facilities that 
begin with coal in these states. Additionally, in RNS, we 
addressed the last phrase in § 802(i), and rejected the 
predicate of the argument that Shamokin raises here—
whether the activities at the plant are usually done by the 
operator of a hypothetical coal mine is not relevant in the 
analysis. In RNS, we placed emphasis on the definite article in 
the phrase “as is usually done by the operator of the coal 
mine.” 115 F.3d at 185 (emphasis added) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). We decided that if 802(i) had an indefinite 
article in place of the definite article, reading instead “the 
operator of a coal mine,” this clause could imply that “one 
might have to compare the activities at the alleged coal mine 
with those of a typical, paradigmatic, ‘usual’ coal mine.” RNS 
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Servs. Inc., 115 F.3d at 185.  However, the sentence as 
written differs. It “simply explains that the work of the coal 
mine is the work that is usually done in that particular place. 
The fact that [a] [s]ite is perhaps an unconventional coal mine 
does not defeat its status as a coal mine for the purposes of 
[§] 802.” Id. Shamokin’s statutory argument is therefore 
without merit.  
 
 Shamokin’s second argument borrows from the 
Dictionary of Mining, Mineral and Related Terms published 
by the U.S. Bureau of Mines, a now defunct federal agency 
that conducted scientific research on the extraction, 
processing, use, and conservation of mineral resources until 
its closure in 1995. The Bureau had defined “coal 
preparation” as “[t]he various physical and mechanical 
processes in which raw coal is dedusted, graded, and treated 
by dry methods (rarely) or water methods, using dense-media 
separation (sink-float), jigs, tables, and flotation. The 
objective is the removal of free dirt, sulfur, and other 
undesirable constituents.” 3 This definition is at least eighteen 
years old and is from an agency that was tasked not with 
safety but rather research. In any event, the words “raw coal” 
do not appear in the Mine Act, and Shamokin has failed to 
show why this definition should take precedence over the one 
in the Mine Act.   
 
 Third, Shamokin asserts that unless the work of 
preparing coal ends “when the raw, run-of-mill extracted 
material has been processed into a usable condition,” the list 
                                              
3
 Available at 
http://webharvest.gov/peth04/20041015011634/imcg.wr.usgs.
gov/dmmrt/ (last accessed June 30, 2014) (emphasis added). 
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of activities enumerated in § 802(i) would be unworkably 
broad. Petitioner’s Br. at 14. Such an interpretation, the 
argument runs, could include “anyone who handles coal, no 
matter how far down the stream of commerce,” subsuming 
non-mining activities such as operations “that use processed 
coal for heating, powering equipment, as a feedstock in 
producing other products, or which merely transport the 
processed coal.” Id. at 14-15. But this Court’s functional 
approach has already managed to weed out such activities. 
For example, without Shamokin’s proposed limitation, we 
determined that delivery of raw coal to a processing facility, 
but not delivery of processed coal to the consumer, counts as 
the work of preparing the coal. See RNS Servs., Inc., 115 F.3d 
at 184. In RNS, the loading of coal for transport to another 
facility for further processing was considered “the work of 
preparing the coal” because the “storage and loading of the 
coal is a critical step in the processing of minerals extracted 
from the earth in preparation for their receipt by an end-user, 
and the Mine Act was intended to reach all such activities.” 
Id. at 185. Thus, through the rubric of the functional test, 
activities that are too far attenuated from the actual processing 
of coal, and which are not “critical” or “integral,” see id. at 
185-86, in preparation of receipt by the end user, will not be 
subsumed under the Mine Act definition and in fact have not 
been.  
 
 Contrary to Shamokin’s assertion, our opinion in 
Dowd v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation 
Programs, 846 F.2d 193, 194-195 (3d Cir. 1988) does not 
counsel in favor of another result.
 4
 In Dowd, we determined 
                                              
4
 Dowd is of limited import here because it was decided under 
Title IV of the Mine Act, or the Black Lung Benefits Act of 
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that a worker was involved in the preparation of coal at a 
“custom coal preparation facility” because his employer dried 
and crushed “unprepared anthracite [coal].” Id. at 195.  
Shamokin asks us to extrapolate from this that the work of 
further preparing prepared coal would thus not be considered 
coal preparation. In so doing, it requests that we convert a 
sufficient condition into a necessary one, but nothing about 
the opinion implies that the facilities have to begin with 
unprepared anthracite to be “custom coal preparation 
facilities.” 
 
 Finally, Shamokin attempts to demonstrate that courts 
routinely cut off Mine Act jurisdiction at the point where raw 
coal becomes usable. Having reviewed the cases cited, we 
agree with the Secretary that none of these cases stands for 
the proposition that the Mine Act does not cover the further 
processing of already processed coal.
5
  
                                                                                                     
1972 (“BLBA”), 30 U.S.C. § 901 et seq., for which Congress 
has specified that a different definition of coal mine applies. 
Compare 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(2) (defining “coal mine” for 
purposes, among others, of subchapter IV of chapter 22, 
which includes the BLBA), with 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(1) 
(defining “coal or other mine” for the rest of chapter 22, 
which includes the Mine Act). 
 
5
 See Petitioner’s Br. at 16-18 (citing Southard v. Dir., 
OWCP, 732 F.2d 66, 68-70 (6th Cir. 1984) (finding under the 
BLBA that a worker who stored, loaded, and unloaded coal 
for a coal retailer was not engaged in the “work of preparing 
the coal” because the coal retailers he worked for were 
“purchasers of prepared coal”); Eplion v. Dir., OWCP, 794 
F.2d 935, 937 (4th Cir. 1986) (finding under the BLBA that a 
 16 
 
 It is also worth noting that Shamokin’s most serious 
mine safety citations involved violations of MSHA’s 
respirable dust standards. Given that the activities at 
Shamokin’s plant trigger the types of safety concerns that the 
Mine Act was intended to remedy, it would defy Congress’s 
intent to allow Shamokin to escape Mine Act jurisdiction 
based on a formality. See RNS Servs., Inc., 115 F.3d at 187 
(noting that the Mine Commission had “legitimate concerns 
about worker safety and health at the Site,” which included 
“[t]rue potential hazards” such as “circulation of dust”). 
 Thus, we decline Shamokin’s invitation to impose 
additional limitations not in the statute and find that MSHA’s 
assertion of jurisdiction over the plant was proper.  
 
                                                                                                     
worker who transported and distributed processed coal was 
not engaged in the “work of preparing the coal” because the 
coal was “already processed and prepared for market before 
[the worker] had any contact with it”); Collins v. Dir., 
OWCP, 795 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1986) (finding under the 
BLBA that a truck driver who hauled slate (coal refuse) from 
the “tipple” at the end of processing was not engaged in coal 
mine employment)). In fact, we have before declined to 
impose a bright line rule that preparation ends “at the point 
when the coal is placed into the processing tipple because we 
are not convinced that each step essential to the preparation of 
the coal for entry into the stream of commerce is completed at 
that point. Thus, [the employer’s] participation in the removal 
of the coal from the tipple was a step, if only the very last 
step, in the preparation of the coal.” Hanna v. Dir., Office of 
Workers’ Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 860 F.2d 88, 
93 (3d Cir. 1988) (looking with skepticism on Collins, 795 
F.2d at 372, relied on by Shamokin). 
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 B. Evidentiary Appeal 
 
 Shamokin also challenges the ALJ’s decision to 
exclude evidence of MSHA’s non-assertion of jurisdiction 
over plants that Shamokin claims are its competitors. 
Shamokin contends that the evidence would have showed an 
inconsistent position regarding MSHA’s exercise of 
jurisdiction over carbon products plants such as Shamokin’s, 
which could call into question the propriety of the Secretary’s 
assertion of jurisdiction here.  
 
 Shamokin submits that a number of memoranda are 
relevant to the question of whether MSHA has consistently 
interpreted the statute to allow for jurisdiction over the further 
processing of non-raw coal. In its brief, Shamokin discusses 
only the operations of the Keystone Filler & Manufacturing 
plant, highlighting a June 22, 2004 memorandum as 
representative, so that is the plant and memorandum we will 
address. According to this memorandum, written by Counsel 
for Standards, Mine Safety and Health, to a District Manager 
of MSHA, Keystone’s facility was not engaged in the “work 
of preparing  the coal” because, 
 
once the coal arrives at this facility, it is already 
fully prepared and ready to be used by Keystone 
as a chemical compound ingredient in the 
manufacture of saleable products for the rubber, 
plastics, and steel products industries. . . . Other 
ingredients are added to it such as coke, 
petroleum laced coke and graphite. Any 
oversized pieces are crushed at Keystone, but 
this crushing is incidental to the manufacturing 
process. As a consumer of fully processed coal 
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sold in the open market, Keystone’s work 
constitutes manufacturing rather than mining, 
and as such, not subject to MSHA jurisdiction. . 
. . [P]reparation ends when the coal is ready for 
use.  
 
App. at A184.  
 
 We agree that the consistency of an agency’s 
application of a statute might  be relevant. See, e.g., Westar 
Energy, Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 473 F.3d 
1239, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“The Order under review is 
arbitrary and capricious in that it provides no basis in fact or 
in logic for the Commission’s refusal to treat Westar as it had 
treated KCPL.”). However, this memorandum is not relevant. 
Keystone was engaged in manufacturing, not coal processing. 
Shamokin argued unsuccessfully to the Mine Commission 
that it, like Keystone, was mainly engaged in the manufacture 
of carbon-based products for the steel, rubber, and plastics 
industries. The Mine Commission determined this assertion 
was factually without merit, as inspectors found no mixing of 
coal with non-coal materials at the plant, and the records 
supplied by Shamokin confirmed that it sold only a few tons 
of products containing no coal or coal mixtures. As such, 
Shamokin’s comparison to Keystone is not apt, as Shamokin 
was mainly engaged in coal processing, not manufacturing of 
other products using coal.  
 
 Furthermore, as the Mine Commission pointed out, 
better evidence on the consistency of MSHA’s jurisdictional 
decisions is the fact that the Secretary through MSHA has 
asserted jurisdiction over Shamokin from 1977 to 2009 
without a change in its operations when the new owners 
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assumed the helm. Indeed, this demonstrates that the 
Secretary has consistently interpreted the statute. We also 
agree with the ALJ’s assessment that the introduction of this 
evidence could have opened up a stream of requests for 
comparisons to facilities all around the country, causing an 
unnecessary delay in the proceedings to address collateral 
matters.  
 
 Given the limited probative value of the evidence, and 
the potential it had to unnecessarily delay the hearing, we 
affirm the Mine Commission’s decision to exclude the 
evidence of MSHA’s non-assertion of jurisdiction over other 
facilities. We find that the agency’s decision was not an abuse 
of discretion. Cf. Bhaya v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 922 
F.2d 184, 187 (3d Cir. 1990); see also United States v. Long, 
574 F.2d 761, 767 (3d Cir. 1978) (“If judicial self-restraint is 
ever desirable, it is when a Rule 403 analysis of a trial court is 
reviewed by an appellate tribunal.”). 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the Petition 
for Review of the Mine Commission’s final order. The 
Secretary’s exercise of jurisdiction over Shamokin through 
MSHA was proper. Furthermore, the ALJ did not commit an 
abuse of discretion by failing to allow into evidence internal 
memoranda between MSHA employees regarding the 
non-assertion of jurisdiction over other facilities. 
